




	I am sorry to say that I am going to begin this paper by doing the always-annoying thing of asking why we are asking this question– or, more precisely, why we ask ourselves this question at this session every year, except for 2007-2011 when we apparently asked “why teach literature, anyway?” Because the short answer to the question, why teach literature, obviously is that it’s one of the more intellectually rewarding things one can do with one’s life, and probably all the more necessary now that it is viewed so skeptically by so many. We may gradually become practitioners of an underappreciated craft skill, like shoe repair. There are many things that interest me about this world, from the mindbending speculations of astrophysics to the endless permutations of disability and intraspecies variation; but nothing engages all my faculties the way literature does. I have been vividly reminded of this over the last two or three years, partly because I finally finished writing The Secret Life of Stories, my first book of full-bore, wall-to-wall literary criticism since my first book 25 years ago, and the experience of immersing myself texts ranging from Harry Potter to The Sound and the Fury, with Maxine Hong Kingston and J. M. Coetzee and Philip K. Dick and Miguel Cervantes and a cast of dozens along the way, was a pure joy. It was the most enjoyable writing I’ve done in twenty years, and much of it drawn from courses I have been teaching lately. And I have been reminded of this partly because among those courses, I finally worked up the courage to teach a large lecture class in science fiction, and despite the fact that there are still a few Sven Birkertsy curmudgeons out there who don’t think science fiction is literature, because they have a working definition of “literature” that excludes about 95 percent of imaginative literature written since Gilgamesh, that teaching experience has been one of the most edifying of my professional life. I’ll say more about why in my conclusion, but for now, I just want to explain why I’m going to get all meta- on the question posed by this session.
	It strikes me as symptomatic (and I use the word advisedly) of a distinctive anxiety in the profession of literary study that we so regularly accuse ourselves (or, far more likely, others) of doing it wrong. One of the legacies of Foucauldian and Marxist literary theory, it would seem, is a mini-genre of professions of misgiving, a kind of gallery of second thoughts, in which we tell ourselves, hold the phone, maybe our powerful critical procedures of debunking and demystification have gone too far, or have become unproductive. Perhaps they are too inattentive to beauty; perhaps they have forgotten how to affirm; perhaps they have simply run out of steam. Maybe we need more reparative reading, or some surface reading, or a skeptical critique of skeptical critique. And this is not something that Rita Felski has but recently discovered, or, before her, Sharon Marcus and Steven Best, or, before them, Eve Sedgwick. This has been a basso continuo of the profession since I entered graduate school in the mid-1980s, when the Group for Research on the Institutionalization and Professionalization of Literary Studies, a project of the Society for Critical Exchange, had a running forum titled “the problem of affirmation in contemporary theory.” 
	Of course, if affirmation has been a problem in contemporary theory for over thirty years, one is tempted to conclude that the problem is real, and in some ways, it is. But now I can tell you why I have never contributed to those debates, even though every now and then I feel vaguely guilty for doing so, as if I have not replied to somebody’s important Facebook thread even though they are a friend in real life. To take Marcus and Best’s essay, for example: I never signed up for the patented “symptomatic” reading advocated by Jameson in The Political Unconscious, so I feel no urgent need to disavow it now. And as for Sedgwick’s call for reparative reading, well, I considered myself more or less as familiar with paranoid reading as anyone– after all, half my first book was about Gravity’s Rainbow, and I was deeply influenced by Leo Bersani’s brilliant essay on the novel, precisely on paranoia as a mode of reading– I didn’t devote all my teaching and writing to the kind of demystifying historicism Marcus and Best construe as the disciplinary norm. I am not averse to demystifying historicism; I have remarked that Adventures of Huckleberry Finn offers white readers a most seductive and ill-earned sense that if they were backwoods boys in antebellum Missouri, they’d have gone to hell for Jim too, and I still want to know how William Dean Howells could write a novel about class and cultural capital in Boston in 1875 without any Irish immigrants in it. But overall, I think I’m the kind of reader, and the kind of literary critic, who demystifies and debunks things from 9 in the morning until 1 in the afternoon, then breaks for lunch, and then spends the afternoon simply trying to understand, in a surface and reparative kind of way, just what an author is trying to do with his or her text. That, it seems to me, is quite intellectually satisfying enough as it is, and in my world it counts as an honest day’s work.
	I should admit that in writing The Secret Life of Stories, I wasn’t simply trying to have fun, though I did have fun; there is even a joke footnote in the book, with a tip of the hat to Beckett, and a joke index entry, hat tip to Nabokov. I did have an agenda. And that agenda was to argue against people whose methods for reading literary texts, even or especially in the field of disability studies, have agendas. So I wrote:
I am committed here not to the project of encyclopedic typology but to an imperative to radical individuation. It is a truism in the intellectual disability community that when you have met one person with autism, you have met ... exactly one person with autism. The range of behaviors and possible positions on the autism spectrum are simply too bewilderingly diverse to admit of generalization. The same is true, to an extent, with the condition I know best, Down syndrome; though the underlying biochemistry, the chromosomal nondisjunction and its genetic consequences, may be the same (hence the “syndrome” part of Down syndrome), the expression of trisomy-21 throughout the human population spans a wide range of talents, deficits, and proclivities. I am going to insist, therefore, on a radically Heraclitean understanding of disability and narrative, whereby we can never step in the same interpretive river twice. And I want to up the ante on the truism about autism: when you’ve met one person with autism, you’ve met one person with autism ... once. The next time you meet that person, he or she will be slightly different, and so will you. The same holds true for literary characters: when you meet one Captain Ahab, or Michael K, you have met one Captain Ahab, or Michael K, once. The next time you encounter them, they too will be slightly different, and so will you.
And this involves taking my distance from David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder’s groundbreaking theory of narrative prosthesis, insofar as I argue that disability in texts does not always result in the kind of narrative prosthesis they describe. “My contention,” I wrote, “is more modest, but more defensible: some narratives do x. Some do not.” I think this is true of every text I’ve taught; I have never been able to step in the same interpretive river twice. When I first taught DeLillo’s White Noise in 1991, I taught it as a lighthearted, Baudrillardian romp through a postmodern world in which the map had become the territory; when I taught it ten years later, I realized it was also a trenchant, moving, existential novel about Being-toward-death, and I took much more seriously the scene in which Jack Gladney visits the graveyard on the way back from the airport. And after the deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, Freddie Gray, and dozens of other black men and women, teaching Baldwin’s Go Tell it on the Mountain meant confronting Richard’s death in the wake of a posthumous history in which, surreal as it may sound, it became politically controversial to insist that black lives matter.
	I am aware that literary characters (and texts) don’t actually change while you’re not reading them. I have no intention of rehearsing the reader-response debates of the 1970s. But when a truly innovative form of criticism comes along, it really does change the terms of what we read for and why. And this is as true for what became of “ambiguity” after Empson got through with it as for what became of lacunae when Sedgwick got though with them. I confess that I had a pretty grandiose ambition in writing my book, which is one reason I took Janet Lyon’s suggestion that I title the book The Secret Life of Stories: I wanted, and I still want, to change the way people think about disability in literary texts. I want people to see disability as something that is not reducible to characters and diagnoses, even when, as in The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time, the text seems emphatically to invite diagnosis. And more than that, I want to show that disability in the relation between reader and text need not involve any specific characters with disabilities at all. Disability– and ideas about disabilities (whether held by readers or by characters)– can serve as a plot device, as a motive for narrative, as a means of exploring nonhuman time scales, and as a way of inquiring into the very meaning of conscious self-awareness. It took me many years of life to figure this out, and now, it is one of the reasons I teach literature– to open up new possibilities for reading, not in the mode of F. R. Leavis’s famous “it is so, is it not?” but more in the manner of “look what I found! Can you find some more?”
	I want to revisit one more moment of our disciplinary history before I try to wind up these remarks. I have taken lately to starting sentences with “I am so old that” (I even did this in a recent issue of PMLA), as in “I am so old that I remember when Michelob was a premium beer”and “I am so old that I remember when cable and public television were commercial-free.” Well, I am so old that I remember when the MLA was routinely attacked, year in and year out, from the right. Now, of course, we know that the MLA is the organization that isn’t doing anything about the casualization of academic labor; back then, we knew that the MLA was a hotbed of interpretive radicalism that was fundamentally hostile to literature itself. And so was born, in 1994, the Association of Literary Scholars and Critics, the organization formed in opposition to the political and theoretical approaches to literature allegedly promoted by the MLA. In 1999, the ALSC began publishing a journal, which they titled Literary Imagination– a title, I suspect, that they imagined would be a decisive rebuke to members of the MLA, none of whom would be caught dead speaking of the literary imagination. And they did something else quite crafty, as well: they encouraged contemporary writers to join the association and speak at their conferences, again, thinking that this is something the MLA would never do. “Come with us,” they seemed to say, “we will treat you right. At the MLA they will only deconstruct and debunk you. We, on the other hand, will appreciate you.” And so now they call themselves the Association of Literary Scholars, Critics, and Writers.
	It seems very silly in retrospect. Surely the reason many of us teach literature, and try to understand the literary imagination, is that we believe that that literary imagination is about something else– that it opens onto the worlds of culture and society, psychology and anthropology, philosophy and history, social and natural science. I was drawn to literature when I was a young man because it is so unfathomably capacious. It can do anything and go anywhere– or, if it wants to stay home, it can explore the myriad possibilities of language itself. When I am in this mood, I think of T. S. Eliot’s famous line, in “The Perfect Critic,” that “there is no method but to be very intelligent.” (I recently went back to that essay and realized that I had forgotten that it comes at the end of a paragraph about Aristotle, of all people, whom Eliot is trying to save from the Aristotelians: “Aristotle is a person who has suffered from the adherence of persons who must be regarded less as his disciples than as his sectaries.” An interesting move, if, like me, you experience Aristotle as one of the most systemic builders of systems in the history of conceptual systems.) As I have remarked to more than one administrator in the course of my life, there are very good reasons why literary study is as unruly a discipline as it is, and why it is so hard to say in bullet points what we do in the classroom. It almost makes me nostalgic for an era in which people could say “we study the literary imagination and we try to be very intelligent about it,” and people would respond, very well, carry on, then.
	I once remarked that the pursuit of literature was perpetually stimulating because there isn’t any chance you’re actually going to catch it. It will always be somewhere else, whether we are talking about (just to take a few examples from my recent reading) the rich delights of Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan novels, the quantum entanglements of Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being, or the sustained hideousness of J. G. Ballard’s Crash. Teaching literature is an enterprise full of invention, delight, shock, disgust, improvisation, and surprise. I honestly could not live life without these things. 
	So, finally, about my science fiction course. After years of being too timid to teach a large 100-level course in science fiction, I proposed one for spring 2014 and then taught it again last spring. And on the first day of class, I was forthright about why I had never taught one before. Students were surprised about this. I think they were either intrigued or appalled that someone my age was dabbling in this for the first time. But I told them two things. One, I am not a specialist in science fiction. I know a good deal about it, but it is not usually part of my portfolio as a scholar and teacher, however much I may have devoured the stuff in my teen years. Two, this is why I demurred twenty years ago when my department head at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign suggested I take over the 150-student science fiction course. He assured me that it would be a great experience for me, it would expand my repertoire, and it would be good for the department’s enrollment numbers as well. I thought it over for a few days, sorely tempted. But I eventually declined, and I admitted to my students in 2014, twenty years later, that I told my department head that at the age of 32, I just didn’t have the confidence to go into a classroom in which some of the students would know more than I do. My class laughed nervously. “And that wasn’t all,” I added. “I was afraid the class would be all-male, and that I would be confronted with at least a dozen guys coming to class in Star Trek uniforms. The red ones, of course– it’s always the engineers.” (My class was in fact about two-thirds male.) But now, I said, I’m 52, and I just don’t worry about things like this anymore. It is certainly going to be the case, at some point this semester, that one or more of you is going to know more about a subject or about an author than I do– though I can promise you that I am one of the world’s most obsessive obsessives when it comes to 2001: A Space Odysset (about which I actually have written). There are people in this classroom from over thirty different majors (only four of them in English), bringing us all kinds of skill sets and knowledge bases. So on that day when one of you knows something I don’t know, speak up. That will be a good day. That will be a day on which I learn something. 
	And sure enough, even in a class of sixty students, we managed to have discussions; and sure enough, the day came when some students knew more than I did about the Drake equation for estimating the number of extraterrestrial civilizations capable of communication, or about the Voyager missions to the outer planets, or about Arthur C. Clarke’s Rendezvous with Rama. And I was right, even though it took me twenty years to get there– there are certain advantages to letting go of the obligation to be the subject supposed to know. So quite apart from all the other reasons I teach literature– to delight, to instruct, to challenge, and (to borrow from Ursula K. LeGuin) to augment the complexity and intensity of the field of intelligent life– I teach literature also in order to learn. 

